The programs Shade’s money moves through
Every launch, trade, claim and private payment on Shade runs through on-chain programs that other teams wrote and outside firms audited. These are the ones Shade calls, with every audit their makers publish. Each report covers its program as it stood at the version the report names; Shade links the reports and does not vouch for them.
- Meteora
Dynamic Bonding Curve
Every Shade token’s curve: the launch and its dev buy, each trade before graduation, and fee claims.
- Offside LabsOct 2026· v0.2.2Report ↗
- ZenithMay 2026· v0.2.0Report ↗
- Code4rena4 Nov 2025· public contestReport ↗
- OtterSecMay 2025· v0.1.3Report ↗
- Meteora
DAMM v2
Where a token trades once it graduates, and where its permanently locked liquidity earns fees.
- Helius
Privacy Rings
Private balances: vault deposits, pass and chip payments, shielded tokens, Mystery Bags, airdrops, rewards and Dark OTC.
Neither covers the Rings SDK or Helius’s hosted prover. Certora’s report is titled Final Report and also stamped Draft. Helius lists a third audit, by OtterSec, as awaiting its report.
Every published report ↗ - Jupiter
Jupiter Lock
Holds a locked dev buy in escrow for the stealth deployer until the lock ends.
- Jupiter
Aggregator v6
Swaps SOL to and from a pair’s quote asset in pair launches, pair trades and sponsored sells.
A swap can route through other exchanges’ programs, which these reports don’t cover.
Every published report ↗ - Solana Program Library
Token-2022
Every Shade token is a Token-2022 mint, and so are some pair assets, tokenized stocks among them.
- Solana Program Library
SPL Token
Wrapped SOL during trades, and pair assets such as USDC.
- Zellic26 Mar 2026· p-token rewriteReport ↗
- Neodyme12 Jun 2025· p-token rewriteReport ↗
- Kudelski21 Sep 2020· original programReport ↗
- Solana Program Library
Associated Token Account
Opens the token account a holder’s tokens land in.
No published audit found.
Anza publishes a formal verification of p-ata, a rewrite of this program (Certora, 14 Oct 2026), but Shade couldn’t confirm that rewrite is the one deployed, so it isn’t counted here.
Every published report ↗
Solana’s built-in System, Compute Budget and Address Lookup Table programs run inside the validator software itself, and the Memo program only records text, so they aren’t listed. Shade deploys no on-chain program of its own.
Shade’s own code
The review, finished on 21 Nov 2026, read Shade’s server side the way an outside reviewer would: every route a visitor can call, and every path where the relay signs or pays. It found 13 issues: 11 are fixed, and each of the others has a fix proposed. None exposes a key.
What was checked
- Every API route under app/api, the request proxy, and the server code in lib/server.
- Each relay path that signs or pays: launches and pair launches, sponsored sells, claims and unlocks, ghost buys and sells, shielded moves, Mystery Bag, airdrop and reward claims, Dark OTC takes and cancels, and who may start the scheduled fee sweeps.
- Request limits, and whether a header can get around them.
- Memory: every cache, map and list kept between requests.
- Use of Shade’s paid Solana RPC: the provider pool, the shared cache and the /api/rpc relay.
- Input checks on every route.
- Secrets: where each key is read, and whether any can reach a response, a log or the browser.
- Blind-signed passes and chips, and the accounts that mark them spent.
- Dependencies, with npm audit, and the repository’s own checks.
Findings
- High
- 4
- Medium
- 3
- Low
- 4
- Info
- 2
- Fixed
- 11
- Open
- 2
- S-01HighRelay-sponsored creator-fee claims
Could cost the relay SOL it didn’t get back.
A sponsored claim could name any receiver, and Meteora’s SDK opens the receiver’s token account with the relay paying for it. Only the deployer’s wrapped-SOL rent was paid back, so each claim to a new receiver cost the relay about 0.0015 SOL: a mainnet simulation of the old transaction left the relay 1,529,340 lamports down against a 15,500-lamport fee. Now the deployer pays back every account the relay opens, at the rent it really holds, and each claim is simulated and refused if the relay would end down more than its network fee.
lib/server/sponsor-tx.ts:23Fixedcommit bb86f08Funds at risk, no keys at risk - S-02HighRelay-signed launches and sponsored sells
Could cost the relay network fees it didn’t get back.
The relay pays the fee of every transaction it signs, even one that fails on chain later. Launches were never simulated or limited, and a pass is spent only when its launch lands, so one pass could ask for signed launches without end and make each one fail by reusing a token address. Sponsored sells never checked what the deployer holds. Now every launch, sell, claim and unlock the relay signs is simulated first and refused if it would fail. A token address that already exists is refused, and a sell must be of tokens the deployer holds. Each pass gets one signed launch a minute and six a day, and each deployer five launches and twenty sponsored moves an hour, counted across server instances.
app/api/launch/route.ts:88Fixedcommit 5040af9Funds at risk, no keys at risk - S-03HighPair launches
Could make the relay spend its SOL before a launch was committed.
A pair launch had the relay swap its dev-buy SOL into the pair’s token before it checked the pass’s intent, the account that limits a pass to one pair. One unused pass could make the relay buy a different token on every request. Now the intent comes first, a swap runs only for that pass’s own pair and at most once, and every launch is simulated before it is returned. On mainnet, a second pair asked for with the same pass was refused before anything was bought.
lib/server/pairs/order.ts:42Fixedcommit 7208774Funds at risk, no keys at risk - S-04HighThe Solana connection Shade provides (/api/rpc)
Had no per-visitor limit, so it could be overused at Shade’s cost.
The relay forwarded up to 20 calls a request to Shade’s keyed Solana providers with no limit. Each visitor may now send 600 calls a minute, 60 of them the Privacy Rings asset scan, under a ceiling for everyone together, and only the 13 methods the browser uses get through. A real browser session, measured, sent at most 61 calls in any minute.
lib/server/rpc-limit.ts:15Fixedcommit 566d8f4No funds at risk, no keys at risk - S-05MediumRequest limits
Were shared by every visitor, so one client could use up an allowance for everyone.
Each limit was one allowance per endpoint for everyone, so one client could use it up, and launches, sponsored moves, holdings and creator reads had none. Each endpoint now also limits each visitor. A visitor is known only by a salted hash of the address Vercel reports, kept in memory and replaced every hour, and nothing about a visitor is logged or stored.
lib/server/visitor.ts:43Fixedcommit 5f7d0e3No funds at risk, no keys at risk - S-06MediumPublic read routes
Read the chain for any address without a per-visitor limit.
Token pages looked up any token with no Shade pool on every request, and wallet, creator and older feed reads read any address or transaction named. A lookup that finds nothing is now remembered for 5 to 60 seconds on every server instance, under a hash of the address, and each visitor gets a limited number of these reads a minute.
lib/server/negative.ts:27Fixedcommit 7fe0dd4No funds at risk, no keys at risk - S-07MediumAfter a launch is prepared
Background chain reads could pile up for launches that are never sent.
Every prepared launch started two minutes of chain reads, even one that was never sent. Now at most one runs per token and eight per server instance, only for a launch that passed its checks, and the browser asks for the token’s private mode itself once its launch lands.
lib/shielded/interface.ts:76Fixedcommit cb14fc5No funds at risk, no keys at risk - S-08LowExplorer feed
A fractional page size bypassed the cache.
A page size like 5.1 or 5.01 was its own cache entry, so each new value read the chain again for every Shade config. Page sizes are now whole numbers from 5 to 50.
app/api/explorer/feed/route.ts:17Fixedcommit b7faf2dNo funds at risk, no keys at risk - S-09LowShared cache
Kept a handle for every write it ever made.
Each value written to the shared cache left an entry in memory for good, one per token page ever loaded on a server instance. The entry now goes once its write lands.
lib/server/shared.ts:114Fixedcommit be630a4No funds at risk, no keys at risk - S-10LowPair quote checks
Memory grew with every token anyone checked.
Prices, names and decimals were kept forever for any token checked as a possible pair, so a server instance’s memory grew with each one. Each list now keeps the newest 5,000 tokens and fetches any other again.
lib/server/pairs/rates.ts:14Fixedcommit 00dd8c6No funds at risk, no keys at risk - S-11LowScheduled fee sweeps
The scheduler’s token was compared in a way that isn’t constant-time.
The scheduler’s token was compared with an ordinary string check, which can stop at the first byte that differs. It is now compared in constant time, as bytes of equal length.
lib/server/cron.ts:10Fixedcommit a1e7021No funds at risk, no keys at risk - S-12InfoMetadata uploads
Anyone can publish a small picture and metadata to Arweave under the relay’s signature.
Details are held back until the fix ships.
Open · fix proposedNo funds at risk, no keys at risk - S-13InfoContent Security Policy
Allows inline scripts, a known trade-off for prerendered pages.
Details are held back until the fix ships.
Open · fix proposedNo funds at risk, no keys at risk
Shade’s repository is private, so each fix is named by its commit’s short hash. Severity follows the impact: high can cost funds or take the site down cheaply, medium needs more effort or affects part of it, low is contained, and info is a known trade-off.
Checked and found sound
- Passes and chips are Chaum blind RSA signatures over a 2,040-bit full-domain hash, with one key per tier. The relay signs only values in range, checks each signature before it returns it, and signs only blinded tokens it finds in its own encrypted payment memos at the tier’s price.
- Each pass and chip is spent by an account created in the same transaction as its launch or buy, so a second use fails on chain.
- Mystery Bag, airdrop, holder-reward and Dark OTC transactions: the relay accepts one exact, unit-tested transaction shape, simulates it with signatures checked, refuses it if its own balance would fall, and sends it itself.
- Shielded moves are simulated and refused if they would cost the relay more than 60,000 lamports. Ghost buys are simulated against the buyer’s minimum and the relay’s reserve. Ghost sells check the seller’s balance and repay the relay’s fee in the same transaction.
- The Rings client, in the browser and on the relay, checks the prover enclave against Helius’s signed policy before it sends any proof inputs.
- The relay key, pass and chip keys, FEATURES_SECRET and the treasury keys are read only in server-only modules, and never returned or logged. The keyed RPC address never reaches the browser.
- Development-only routes answer 404 in production.
- The explorer’s per-visitor limit reads the client address Vercel sets itself, which a request header can’t override.
- npm audit reports 0 known vulnerabilities across all 827 installed packages. The 200-line rule, Prettier and all 145 unit tests pass.
What Shade can and can’t see
An audit says whether code does what it should. It doesn’t say what the operator can see. That is written up once, in How it works, so it can’t drift out of step with this page.
- How it worksTrust assumptionsWho sees what: Shade’s relay, Helius’s prover, the RPC, your wallet app, everyone.
- How it worksWhat links a launch to a personThe links Shade removes, and the ones that stay public.
- How it worksCheck it yourselfHow to confirm each claim on chain, without taking Shade’s word for it.
Report a vulnerability
If you find a way to move funds that aren’t yours, make the relay pay for something it shouldn’t, or link a launch to its buyer, please tell Shade privately before telling anyone else, and give the team time to fix it. Don’t test against other people’s funds.
Shade has no private reporting channel yet. Set one in lib/security/contact.ts before this page ships.