Security

What’s been checked, and by whom.

Shade’s money moves through on-chain programs that outside firms have audited, and through Shade’s own code, which no outside firm has audited yet. This page keeps the two apart: each program audit links to its report, and Shade’s own review lists what it found and what is fixed.

On-chain programs
7 of 8with a published third-party audit
Shade’s own code
Not yetaudited by a third party
Internal review
11 of 13findings fixed, 21 Nov 2026
01

The programs Shade’s money moves through

Every launch, trade, claim and private payment on Shade runs through on-chain programs that other teams wrote and outside firms audited. These are the ones Shade calls, with every audit their makers publish. Each report covers its program as it stood at the version the report names; Shade links the reports and does not vouch for them.

Solana’s built-in System, Compute Budget and Address Lookup Table programs run inside the validator software itself, and the Memo program only records text, so they aren’t listed. Shade deploys no on-chain program of its own.

02

Shade’s own code

The review, finished on 21 Nov 2026, read Shade’s server side the way an outside reviewer would: every route a visitor can call, and every path where the relay signs or pays. It found 13 issues: 11 are fixed, and each of the others has a fix proposed. None exposes a key.

What was checked

  • Every API route under app/api, the request proxy, and the server code in lib/server.
  • Each relay path that signs or pays: launches and pair launches, sponsored sells, claims and unlocks, ghost buys and sells, shielded moves, Mystery Bag, airdrop and reward claims, Dark OTC takes and cancels, and who may start the scheduled fee sweeps.
  • Request limits, and whether a header can get around them.
  • Memory: every cache, map and list kept between requests.
  • Use of Shade’s paid Solana RPC: the provider pool, the shared cache and the /api/rpc relay.
  • Input checks on every route.
  • Secrets: where each key is read, and whether any can reach a response, a log or the browser.
  • Blind-signed passes and chips, and the accounts that mark them spent.
  • Dependencies, with npm audit, and the repository’s own checks.

Findings

High
4
Medium
3
Low
4
Info
2
Fixed
11
Open
2
  1. S-01
    High
    Relay-sponsored creator-fee claims

    Could cost the relay SOL it didn’t get back.

    A sponsored claim could name any receiver, and Meteora’s SDK opens the receiver’s token account with the relay paying for it. Only the deployer’s wrapped-SOL rent was paid back, so each claim to a new receiver cost the relay about 0.0015 SOL: a mainnet simulation of the old transaction left the relay 1,529,340 lamports down against a 15,500-lamport fee. Now the deployer pays back every account the relay opens, at the rent it really holds, and each claim is simulated and refused if the relay would end down more than its network fee.

    lib/server/sponsor-tx.ts:23
    Fixedcommit bb86f08Funds at risk, no keys at risk
  2. S-02
    High
    Relay-signed launches and sponsored sells

    Could cost the relay network fees it didn’t get back.

    The relay pays the fee of every transaction it signs, even one that fails on chain later. Launches were never simulated or limited, and a pass is spent only when its launch lands, so one pass could ask for signed launches without end and make each one fail by reusing a token address. Sponsored sells never checked what the deployer holds. Now every launch, sell, claim and unlock the relay signs is simulated first and refused if it would fail. A token address that already exists is refused, and a sell must be of tokens the deployer holds. Each pass gets one signed launch a minute and six a day, and each deployer five launches and twenty sponsored moves an hour, counted across server instances.

    app/api/launch/route.ts:88
    Fixedcommit 5040af9Funds at risk, no keys at risk
  3. S-03
    High
    Pair launches

    Could make the relay spend its SOL before a launch was committed.

    A pair launch had the relay swap its dev-buy SOL into the pair’s token before it checked the pass’s intent, the account that limits a pass to one pair. One unused pass could make the relay buy a different token on every request. Now the intent comes first, a swap runs only for that pass’s own pair and at most once, and every launch is simulated before it is returned. On mainnet, a second pair asked for with the same pass was refused before anything was bought.

    lib/server/pairs/order.ts:42
    Fixedcommit 7208774Funds at risk, no keys at risk
  4. S-04
    High
    The Solana connection Shade provides (/api/rpc)

    Had no per-visitor limit, so it could be overused at Shade’s cost.

    The relay forwarded up to 20 calls a request to Shade’s keyed Solana providers with no limit. Each visitor may now send 600 calls a minute, 60 of them the Privacy Rings asset scan, under a ceiling for everyone together, and only the 13 methods the browser uses get through. A real browser session, measured, sent at most 61 calls in any minute.

    lib/server/rpc-limit.ts:15
    Fixedcommit 566d8f4No funds at risk, no keys at risk
  5. S-05
    Medium
    Request limits

    Were shared by every visitor, so one client could use up an allowance for everyone.

    Each limit was one allowance per endpoint for everyone, so one client could use it up, and launches, sponsored moves, holdings and creator reads had none. Each endpoint now also limits each visitor. A visitor is known only by a salted hash of the address Vercel reports, kept in memory and replaced every hour, and nothing about a visitor is logged or stored.

    lib/server/visitor.ts:43
    Fixedcommit 5f7d0e3No funds at risk, no keys at risk
  6. S-06
    Medium
    Public read routes

    Read the chain for any address without a per-visitor limit.

    Token pages looked up any token with no Shade pool on every request, and wallet, creator and older feed reads read any address or transaction named. A lookup that finds nothing is now remembered for 5 to 60 seconds on every server instance, under a hash of the address, and each visitor gets a limited number of these reads a minute.

    lib/server/negative.ts:27
    Fixedcommit 7fe0dd4No funds at risk, no keys at risk
  7. S-07
    Medium
    After a launch is prepared

    Background chain reads could pile up for launches that are never sent.

    Every prepared launch started two minutes of chain reads, even one that was never sent. Now at most one runs per token and eight per server instance, only for a launch that passed its checks, and the browser asks for the token’s private mode itself once its launch lands.

    lib/shielded/interface.ts:76
    Fixedcommit cb14fc5No funds at risk, no keys at risk
  8. S-08
    Low
    Explorer feed

    A fractional page size bypassed the cache.

    A page size like 5.1 or 5.01 was its own cache entry, so each new value read the chain again for every Shade config. Page sizes are now whole numbers from 5 to 50.

    app/api/explorer/feed/route.ts:17
    Fixedcommit b7faf2dNo funds at risk, no keys at risk
  9. S-09
    Low
    Shared cache

    Kept a handle for every write it ever made.

    Each value written to the shared cache left an entry in memory for good, one per token page ever loaded on a server instance. The entry now goes once its write lands.

    lib/server/shared.ts:114
    Fixedcommit be630a4No funds at risk, no keys at risk
  10. S-10
    Low
    Pair quote checks

    Memory grew with every token anyone checked.

    Prices, names and decimals were kept forever for any token checked as a possible pair, so a server instance’s memory grew with each one. Each list now keeps the newest 5,000 tokens and fetches any other again.

    lib/server/pairs/rates.ts:14
    Fixedcommit 00dd8c6No funds at risk, no keys at risk
  11. S-11
    Low
    Scheduled fee sweeps

    The scheduler’s token was compared in a way that isn’t constant-time.

    The scheduler’s token was compared with an ordinary string check, which can stop at the first byte that differs. It is now compared in constant time, as bytes of equal length.

    lib/server/cron.ts:10
    Fixedcommit a1e7021No funds at risk, no keys at risk
  12. S-12
    Info
    Metadata uploads

    Anyone can publish a small picture and metadata to Arweave under the relay’s signature.

    Details are held back until the fix ships.

    Open · fix proposedNo funds at risk, no keys at risk
  13. S-13
    Info
    Content Security Policy

    Allows inline scripts, a known trade-off for prerendered pages.

    Details are held back until the fix ships.

    Open · fix proposedNo funds at risk, no keys at risk

Shade’s repository is private, so each fix is named by its commit’s short hash. Severity follows the impact: high can cost funds or take the site down cheaply, medium needs more effort or affects part of it, low is contained, and info is a known trade-off.

Checked and found sound

  • Passes and chips are Chaum blind RSA signatures over a 2,040-bit full-domain hash, with one key per tier. The relay signs only values in range, checks each signature before it returns it, and signs only blinded tokens it finds in its own encrypted payment memos at the tier’s price.
  • Each pass and chip is spent by an account created in the same transaction as its launch or buy, so a second use fails on chain.
  • Mystery Bag, airdrop, holder-reward and Dark OTC transactions: the relay accepts one exact, unit-tested transaction shape, simulates it with signatures checked, refuses it if its own balance would fall, and sends it itself.
  • Shielded moves are simulated and refused if they would cost the relay more than 60,000 lamports. Ghost buys are simulated against the buyer’s minimum and the relay’s reserve. Ghost sells check the seller’s balance and repay the relay’s fee in the same transaction.
  • The Rings client, in the browser and on the relay, checks the prover enclave against Helius’s signed policy before it sends any proof inputs.
  • The relay key, pass and chip keys, FEATURES_SECRET and the treasury keys are read only in server-only modules, and never returned or logged. The keyed RPC address never reaches the browser.
  • Development-only routes answer 404 in production.
  • The explorer’s per-visitor limit reads the client address Vercel sets itself, which a request header can’t override.
  • npm audit reports 0 known vulnerabilities across all 827 installed packages. The 200-line rule, Prettier and all 145 unit tests pass.
03

What Shade can and can’t see

04

Report a vulnerability

If you find a way to move funds that aren’t yours, make the relay pay for something it shouldn’t, or link a launch to its buyer, please tell Shade privately before telling anyone else, and give the team time to fix it. Don’t test against other people’s funds.

TODO · reporting contact not set

Shade has no private reporting channel yet. Set one in lib/security/contact.ts before this page ships.